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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ARBITRATION-ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS ARISING
FROM AN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACT-Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
3346 (1985).
I. FACTS
In conjunction with becoming a Chrysler-Mitsubishi dealer, Re-
spondent, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (Soler), on October 31, 1979,
entered a "Sales Procedure Agreement" with Chrysler International,
S.A. (CISA) and Petitioner, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (Mit-
subishi).' Included in the agreement was a clause providing that "all
disputes, controversies or differences which may arise" between Mit-
subishi and Soler concerning certain sections of the agreement would
be settled by arbitration in Japan.2 Due to a sharp decline in sales
in 1981, Soler became unable to meet its minimum sales commit-
ments.' By the spring of 1981, Soler's dangerously swollen inventory
prompted the dealer to request that Mitsubishi delay or cancel several
shipments of vehicles.4 Soler eventually disclaimed responsibility for
withheld shipments, amounting to almost one thousand vehicles, which
Mitsubishi had stored in Japan.'
I Soler is a Puerto Rico corporation with its principal place of business in Pueblo
Viejo, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. Chrysler International, S.A., a Swiss corporation
registered in Geneva, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Chrysler Corporation. Mit-
subishi is a joint venture between Chrysler International, S.A. and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Inc., a Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in Tokyo,
Japan. The joint venture was formed to distribute vehicles manufactured by Mit-
subishi through Chrysler dealers located outside the continental United States. Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3349 (1985).
2 Id. The arbitration proceedings would be governed by the rules and regulations
of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Id.
Id. As Soler's initial sales performance was quite good, Mitsubishi and Soler
had agreed to increase Soler's minimum sales volume for 1981. Id.
4 Id. As an alternative means of dealing with its inventory problems, Soler requested
that a quantity of its vehicles be transshipped for sale in the continental United
States and Latin America. Mitsubishi refused, citing possible problems with Japanese
trade policy and the unsuitability of the vehicles for use in colder climates or in
countries where high-octane unleaded fuel was unavailable.
I Id. at 3350.
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On March 15, 1982, Mitsubishi brought suit against Soler in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, alleging
various breaches of contract and seeking an order to compel arbi-
tration under the Federal Arbitration Act 6 and the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 7 Soler
denied these allegations and raised various counterclaims, including
a cause of action under the Sherman Act.' The district court ordered
arbitration of all disputed issues except two involving defamation and
one concerning discriminatory treatment and the establishment of
minimum sales volumes, and Soler appealed. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed
with the district court's finding that virtually all of the claims fell
within the scope of the arbitration clause. 0 Contrary to the district
court's view, however, it held that arbitration of the antitrust claim
was precluded by a strong federal policy disfavoring the arbitration
of antitrust claims in domestic cases." On appeal, held, reversed as
to the arbitrability of Soler's antitrust claim. Concerns of international
comity and the need for predictability in the resolution of international
commercial disputes outweigh concerns justifying refusal of arbitra-
tion in domestic cases and require the enforcement of contract pro-
visions governing the manner in which disputes under the contract
are to be resolved. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Ply-
mouth, Inc., U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
6 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§
1-14 (1982)). Section Four of the Act directs the district courts to compel arbitration
when it appears that the making of the arbitration agreement or compliance therewith
is not in issue. Among Mitsubishi's allegations was Soler's failure to pay for the
withheld shipments and their storage. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3350 n.2.
I Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3350. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982), [hereinafter cited as
Convention]. The Convention has been adopted by over 50 nations, including the
major industrialized nations. A.J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YoRK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958, at 410 (1981).
8 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3350. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § I et seq.
(1982). In its antitrust claim, Soler alleged that Mitsubishi's refusal to allow Soler
to transship vehicles was part of a conspiracy between Chrysler and Mitsubishi to
divide markets in restraint of trade. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351.
Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351 and n.7. In compelling arbitration of the antitrust
claim, the district court relied on Sherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
For a discussion of Sherck, see infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
1" Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 159-
61 (1st Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 162.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The enactment by Congress in 1925 of the Federal Arbitration Act
marked the beginning of a strong federal policy favoring the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. Previously, some courts had
been reluctant to enforce such agreements because they perceived that
their jurisdiction would be unduly displaced if disputes which they
were accustomed to settling came to be resolved through arbitration.12
The Act made clear that agreements to arbitrate should stand or fall
on the same gounds as any other type of contract. 3 Since passage
of the Act, courts have continually reinforced strong approval of the
policies embodied in the Act favoring arbitration. 4
The extension of these policies to arbitration agreements made in
international commercial contracts was evidenced by the accession of
the United States in 1970 to the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 5 The Convention sought
to "unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed
and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries."',6 The
patchwork of bilateral and multilateral arbitration treaties that existed
before the Convention had produced grave uncertainties as to the
effectiveness of any given international arbitration agreement. 7 To-
,2 See, e.g., United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R.,
211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914); Vynior's Case, 8 Coke 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597
(K.B. 1609). The Act was designed to eradicate such judicial hostility toward ar-
bitration agreements, which Congress and many courts considered an anachronistic
vestige of the old English courts' jealous protection of their jurisdiction. H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). See also Quigley, Accession by the United
States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
11 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides that any written agreement to arbitrate contained in "a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."
"4 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242-43 (1985);
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 404-06 (1967).
' Convention, supra note 7.
61 Sherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
7 See Quigley, supra note 12, at 1051-59. The bilateral accords usually took the
form of arbitration clauses in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
concluded between the United States and another country. The provisions of these
clauses varied widely from treaty to treaty. For example, a treaty with China called
for the recognition of arbitral awards only in the country in which the award was
rendered, while a later treaty with the Netherlands provided for recognition and
enforcement in both countries. Treaties had not been concluded with many countries
by the time of the Convention. Id.
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day, once an attorney determines that the country with whose citizen
his client wants to do business is a party to the Convention, he can
predict how that country will treat arbitration agreements.
Against this background of respect for arbitration agreements is
poised the determination by United States courts that the nature of
certain disputes makes them peculiarly inappropriate for resolution
in an arbitral forum.1 8 While courts have retained jurisdiction over
such disputes in domestic cases, competing considerations of inter-
national comity have caused courts to compel arbitration where in-
ternational commercial contracts were involved.19 In Wilko v. Swan,2 0
the Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement being litigated
was invalid because it was prohibited by the Securities Act of 1933.21
Twenty years later, the Court upheld an arbitration agreement even
though it assumed arguendo that the agreement violated analogous
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.22 The Sherck Court
reasoned that since the contract before it was a "truly international
agreement," its arbitration provision served the purpose of eliminating
any uncertainty as to which country's laws would govern the resolution
of disputes arising from the contract. Refusing to enforce the pro-
18 For examples of cases in which the courts have cited certain subject matters as
being inappropriate for resolution through arbitration see, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953) (securities); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development
Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971) (patent validity);
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (antitrust). The only types of arbitration agreements which the Federal Ar-
bitration Act specifically prohibits are those involving the employment contracts of
"seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1.
'9 See, e.g., Sherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (securities); Fo-
tochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975) (bankruptcy); Anco
Shipping Co. v. Sidermar S.P.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 553
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977) (trade boycott).
2,, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
21 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)).
The Court found that the arbitration agreement came within the purview of § 77n,
which provides that "[any . . . stipulation . . . binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter ... shall be
void." The agreement was seen by the Court as waiving § 77v, which allows the
securities purchaser to choose the forum in which he will bring suit. Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 430-35 (1953).
2 Sherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Section 78cc of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-78kk (1982)), is essentially identical to the waiver provision of the 1933 Act.
Section 78aa provides the purchaser with fewer forum choices than does the 1933
Act, by not allowing suit to be brought in a state court.
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vision would frustrate this purpose and would "invite unseemly and
mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical liti-
gation advantages. "23 The Court likened international arbitration
agreements to forum selection clauses, the enforcement of which it
had vigorously championed two terms earlier. 24
Unlike the securities exception to the federal policy favoring ar-
bitration, the nonarbitrability of antitrust claims had no purported
foundation in any statutory prohibition. Rather, it is based on four
policy considerations first enunciated in the purely domestic case of
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co. 2 First,
the vitality of the private antitrust action is essential to a competitive
economy, the maintenance of which is a national concern. 26 Second,
the likelihood that contracts which generate antitrust claims are con-
tracts of adhesion counsels against the enforcement of arbitration
clauses found therein.27 Third, the arbitration process is ill-suited to
the complexity of antitrust cases. 28 Finally, since arbitrators are gen-
erally drawn from the business community, they might not be so
diligent in the enforcement of laws regulating business as would an
impartial jurist. 29 Reasoning that these considerations outweighed the
competing international concerns announced in Sherck, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in 1983 declined to enforce an arbitration
21 Sherck, 417 U.S. at 515-17.
24 Id. at 518-19. In the case of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1 (1972), the Court criticized what it perceived as a widespread judicial hostility
toward forum selection clauses in stating that "[t]he expansion of American business
and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we
insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and
in our courts." Id. at 9. The Bremen was a logical extension of National Equipment
Rental Co. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), a domestic case which recognized the
right of contracting parties to designate the forum in which disputes arising from
the contract would be settled. The validity of forum selection clauses in international
contracts was also recently affirmed in AVC Netherland B.V. v. Atrium Investment
Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984), a case which relied heavily upon The
Bremen.
2- 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
21 The court likened the plaintiff in an antitrust suit to a "private attorney-general,"
thus implying that the Department of Justice was not itself capable of policing all
antitrust violations. Id. at 826.
27 Id. at 827. While the court offered no support for this presumption, it is
ostensibly derived from the perception that antitrust plaintiffs are generally in a
position of inferior bargaining power in relation to antitrust defendants.
2K Id.
29 Id.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
clause in an antitrust dispute involving an international commercial
contract.30
III. THE DECISION
The Supreme Court's reversal of the First Circuit's decision in 1985
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.3 was
predicated upon an affirmation of the international concerns of Sherck
as well as an attack upon the basic premises of the American Safety
doctrine. While the court of appeals essentially recapitulated the
rationale of American Safety,3 2 the Supreme Court critically examined
each of the four policies disfavoring the arbitration of antitrust claims
in light of the factual context of the case and the realities of the
arbitration process.3 3
The Court began its inquiry by questioning the proposition that
arbitration clauses should not be enforced in antitrust cases because
contracts which generate antitrust claims are likely to be contracts
of adhesion.14 The Court found no reason to assume that an arbi-
tration clause is the product of an unfair bargaining process unless
the party resisting arbitration makes a claim to that effect. 5 In
answering the objection that antitrust claims are too complex to be
arbitrated, the Court cited the flexibility and access to expertise
afforded by arbitration, since arbitrators and experts can be chosen
with an eye toward the subject matter of the dispute.3 6 This ability
to choose arbitrators familiar with antitrust issues would seem to be
a luxury unavailable in the courts. Trial judges are not necessarily
antitrust experts, and the ability of jurors to cope with the complexities
of antitrust litigation has been questioned.3 7 Doubting that even courts
adhering to the American Safety doctrine are convinced by the com-
plexity objection,38 the Court noted that they sanction arbitration
Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d 155.
- 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
2 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 162. The court took no judicial notice of the procedures
of the arbitral body to which the parties were to submit the dispute.
• Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357-60. Cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 429-30
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (as an early advocate of determining whether the
proposed arbitration process will protect the rights of the party resisting arbitration).
14 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
11 Id. Soler made no such claim. Id.
Id. at 3357-58.
See In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980) (as an example of such questioning).
• Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
[Vol. 16:355
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agreements executed after the antitrust dispute has arisen.3 9 The ability
to mold the composition of the arbitral panel to the needs of the
case was also cited as minimizing any hostility which that panel might
have toward legislation imposing restraints on business. The Court
answered the criticism that an arbitral tribunal composed of busi-
nessmen would be lax in the enforcement of such legislation by
pointing out that arbitrators are not necessarily drawn from the
business community and that disputants often enlist lawyers as ar-
bitrators where important legal questions permeate the -dispute.
°
To complete its attack on the American Safety doctrine, the Court
turned to what it considered the heart of that doctrine - the pivotal
role played by the private cause of action in the enforcement of
antitrust laws. 4' Proponents of the American Safety doctrine had
argued that allowing the arbitration of antitrust claims would diminish
the compensation and deterrence functions of the treble damages
action conferred by the Clayton Act. 42 The Court answered this
argument by pointing out that since arbitral tribunals generally decide
disputes arising under national law in accordance with such law,
43
See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 168 n.12 (expressing no opinion on the question
of whether arbitration agreements are enforceable if entered into after the antitrust
dispute has arisen); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47-49 (5th Cir. 1974) (enforcing
implied arbitration agreement entered into after the antitrust dispute arose); Coenen
v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 949 (1972) (enforcing express arbitration agreement executed after the inception
of the antitrust dispute).
4' Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3358. The arbitral panel selected to hear the Mitsubishi-
Soler dispute consisted of three Japanese lawyers: a former law school dean, a
former judge, and an attorney who had published works dealing with the antitrust
laws of both Japan and the United States. Id. at 3358 n.18. No "typical" arbitral
panel exists. Under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), for
example, each party has the option of designating an arbitrator. The chairman of
the panel is chosen by the national committee of the ICC in the country where the
arbitration will take place. An arbitrator designated by a party will not be confirmed
if he is found not to be independent from that party. Paulsson, Arbitration Under
the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 251-53 (Carbonneau, ed. 1984).
Obviously, each party should designate arbitrators knowledgeable in the subject
matter of the dispute to be arbitrated.
Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3358. The Court presumably considered the private
action crucial, because potential antitrust plaintiffs are closer than the government
to events constituting antitrust violations. Such plaintiffs are, therefore, more likely
to report such violations to a court, thus providing "a crucial deterrent to potential
violators." Id.
42 See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 168.
4 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3359. In its amicus brief, the International Chamber
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these functions will be effectuated when a party seeks to vindicate
its statutory rights in an arbitral forum." While the Court took pains
to represent that it did not question the validity of the American
Safety doctrine in the domestic arena,45 it is difficult to see why the
above-outlined criticisms of that doctrine would not apply with equal
force in domestic antitrust cases. 46
IV. COMMENT
The Court's approach of recognizing the adaptability of the ar-
bitration process to the needs of a particular case is much more
realistic than blind adherence to a doctrine formulated in the context
of arbitration procedures available twenty years ago. 47 The American
Safety doctrine, which amounts to a per se prohibition of the ar-
bitration of antitrust claims, would tempt a party resisting arbitration
of Commerce expressed the opinion that Soler's antitrust claim would be decided
under the Sherman Act. Counsel for Mitsubishi indicated that the claim had been
submitted to the arbitral panel with such an understanding. Id. at 3359 n.19. Failure
to apply the relevant national law in the arbitration process would indeed be im-
prudent, as the resulting arbitral award frequently must be converted into a court
judgment in order to be collected. Yates, Arbitration or Court Litigation for Private
International Dispute Resolution: The Lesser of Two Evils, in RESOLVING TRANS-
NATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 232 (Carbonneau, ed.,
1984).
Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3358-60. The Court emphasized that compensation
was the primary goal of the treble damages action, citing for support Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977). Why the Court
was so careful to make this point is not clear unless perhaps it was anticipating
criticism that the more private nature of the arbitration process would not so
effectively serve the deterrent function as would a court action. Also noteworthy is
that courts following American Safety do not seem to think that the purposes of
the private antitrust action are undermined when a claim is abandoned or when
parties to such actions settle out of court. Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust - Are
They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1097, 1106-07 (1969). Litigants in three of
the leading cases establishing the antitrust exception to arbitrability, including those
in American Safety, eventually settled out of court. Id.
41 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
For a more comprehensive discussion of the policies underlying the antitrust
exception to arbitrability, see generally Aksen, supra note 44; Loevinger, Antitrust
Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085 (1969); Pitofsky, Ar-
bitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072 (1969).
47 Several arbitration procedures employed in the Mitsubishi-Soler dispute were
cited shortly after the American Safety decision by one commentator as modifications
necessary for the arbitration of antitrust disputes to be appropriate. Pitofsky, supra
note 46, at 1084.
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to raise superfluous antitrust claims. 48 The resultant procedural and
substantive quagmire is an unnecessary burden on an already over-
worked judiciary.
Somewhat less exhaustive, but equally important, was the Court's
treatment of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 49 which was for the most part confined
to a footnote.50 In limiting its treatment of the Convention, the Court
largely ignored what would seem to be a strong basis of support for
its decision. Article II(1) of the Convention dictates that arbitration
agreements "concerning a subject matter capable of arbitration" shall
be recognized.5 A court, when confronted with a dispute which falls
within the scope of such a recognized agreement, is required by article
11(3) to refer the parties to arbitration if requested to do so.52 Article
1 For an example of such maneuvering, see Helfenbein v. International Industries,
Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971). One
court has remarked that "[airbitration is often thought of as a quick and efficient
method for determining controversies. Unfortunately, cases involving arbitration
clauses sometimes are best remembered as monuments to delay because of the
litigation and appeals antecedent to the actual arbitration." Standard Chlorine of
Delaware, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1967).
Convention, supra note 7.
Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360 n.21. Similarly, the Court relegated its discussion
of the Convention to a note in Sherck, citing the United States' accession to the
Convention as being "strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent
with the decision we reach today." Sherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
520 n.15 (1974).
" Convention, supra note 7, art. II, para. 1, which provides in full:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.
The "subject matter" clause of article II(1) has been called "one of the most
troublesome provisions of the entire Convention." Aksen, American Arbitration
Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral A wards, 3 Sw.
U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1971). For further commentary on the varying interpretations of
this clause see, for example, VAN DEN BERG, supra note 7, at 152-54; McMahon,
Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in
the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM., 735, 753-56 (1971), Quigley, supra note
12, at 1062-64.
52 Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11, para. 3, which provides in full:
The court of a Contracting Stite, when seized of an action in a matter
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning
of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
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V(2)(a) allows a court to decline enforcement of an arbitral award
if "the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country."" The Court agreed
with the appeals court's conclusion that since the language of V(2)(a)
is "symmetrical ' 5 4 with that of II(1), arbitration agreements need
not be recognized, hence enforced, when they clash with domestic
notions of arbitrability."
The courts' paths diverge, however, on the matter of whose notions
of arbitrability control the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
The court of appeals believed that its own notions, derived from
American Safety and its progeny, could trigger the "subject matter
exception" of article II(1), and thus found its holding to be in accord
with the Convention. 6 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, took
a much narrower view of that exception. It declared that subject-
matter exceptions should be recognized "only where Congress has
.. . expressly directed the courts to do so. ' ' 17 This declaration cannot
be read to imply that any statute prohibiting arbitration will trigger
the exception of article II(1), as the Court decided in Sherck that
" Id. art. V, para. 2a. Article V(2) provides in full:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement
is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.
It is generally accepted that V(2)(a) is merely a specific instance of the "public
policy exception" of V(2)(b). VAN DEN BERG, supra note 7, at 350.
-4 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 164. Apparently, in terming the two provisions "sym-
metrical," the court of appeals was referring to the similarity of the language
employed in these provisions. Both provisions contain the phrase "subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration." However, only V(2)(a) adds "under the law
of that country."
" Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360 n.21. This conclusion essentially reads "under
the law of that country" into II(1). It has been said that such a reading enhances
the internal consistency of the Convention. This reading also finds support in the
argument that since a court's competence is based upon the law of the nation in
which it sits, that law should be consulted on the question of whether the court's
jurisdiction has been lawfully excluded by an arbitration agreement. VAN DEN BERG,
supra note 7, at 152-54.
16 Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 164-66. The court of appeals decided that a federal
judicial policy of disallowing the arbitration of antitrust claims was sufficient to
trigger the subject matter exception of 1I(1). Id. Once this exception is brought into
play, a court need not enforce the arbitration agreement which it is considering.
See supra note 51, for the full text of article 11(1) of the Convention.
5 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360 n.21.
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just such a statute would not bar enforcement.58 Rather, the Court
referred to congressional directives which specify matters which are
to be excluded from the scope of the Convention. 59
The Court's reading of the subject-matter exception was extraor-
dinary because Congress has yet to exclude any such matters. 60 Of
course, courts may still invalidate arbitration agreements on grounds
of basic contractual notions such as fraud or undue influence, 6' but
the decision emasculates their authority to invalidate clauses calling
for arbitration on policy grounds. The Court's extremely narrow
reading of article II(1) of the Convention has further constricted a
public policy exception to the Convention which had previously been
criticized as "useless if not altogether nonexistent. '62
The Court's decision dealt only with the enforcement of arbitration
agreements; a court's authority under article V(2) to refuse enforce-
ment of an arbitral award remains untouched. As a result, judicial
intervention in the arbitration process will largely be confined to the
award enforcement stage. This aspect of the Court's ruling will be
beneficial because it will force parties to "let off steam" at the
arbitration table, thereby avoiding vexatious and costly litigation. If
the parties can discover through arbitration that otherwise "nonar-
bitrable" claims are without merit, much judicial energy will be saved.
The Court's decision also allows a protective escape mechanism,
since under article V(2) courts can refuse enforcement of arbitral
awards offensive to the interests of the laws under which the claims
arose. 63 The efficacy of judicial review at the award enforcement
18 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussion of Sherck).
., Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360 n.21. Presumably such directions would take the
form of legislation amending the Convention (9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08).
61 Id. There would, therefore, seem to be no "category of claims" capable of
triggering the subject-matter is exception of article 11(1). The determination of whether
a particular subject-matter is arbitrable is essentially relegated to the arbitrators, a
result which "would come closer to providing the parties with the intended result
that they provided for in their international contract." Aksen, supra note 51, at 8-
9.
' See supra note 52 for full text of article 11(3) of the Convention, which provides
for invalidation on such grounds. See also Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d
184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982) (limiting the "null and void" clause of article 11(3) to
situations such as fraud).
612 Comment, The Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Ar-
bitral Awards, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 228, 245 (1977). But see VAN DEN BERG, supra
note 7, at 367-68 (arguing that such criticism is not justified and that the narrowing
of public policy exceptions should rather be viewed as a beneficial retreat from
earlier parochial attitudes).
3 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
stage, however, to a large extent depends upon the record generated
by the arbitration procedure. Given the likelihood that parties will
now be held to their agreements to arbitrate, it becomes very important
that an attorney be careful to ensure that the arbitral tribunal before
which his client may appear provides for adequate recording of its
proceedings. 64
In contrast to its novel interpretation of the Convention, the Court
left undisturbed the policy that domestic notions of arbitrability
should not control the enforcement of international arbitration agree-
ments. Rather, the arguments of Sherck65 and The Bremen66 were
cited as proof of the validity of these policies. 67 The Court once again
advocated respect for "freely negotiated choice-of-forum provi-
sions. ' ' 68 Such provisions, the Court reasoned, play the important
role of affording the parties predictability of dispute resolution. 69 A
"parochial" 70 refusal to enforce arbitration agreements would destroy
this predictability and lead to retaliatory litigation responses. 71 For
example, Mitsubishi might have made a preemptive strike against
Soler by obtaining an order from a Japanese court enjoining Soler
from litigation in United States courts. The resulting international
judicial stalemate could only have negative repercussions. The Court
failed, however, to address the possibility that insistence on settling
international antitrust matters in United States courts might invite
retaliation on a larger scale. A perception by other countries that
this insistence constitutes an extraterritorial extension of United States
64 The Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association, for example, provides for
stenographic recording of proceedings at the request of the parties or by order of
the tribunal and for a statement of the reasons for the award. Mitsubishi, 105 S.
Ct. at 3360 n.20.
65 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 24.
61 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355-57.
61 Id. at 3356.
69 Id.
10 Both the court of appeals, Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 163, and the dissent in the
principal case, Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3372, misinterpreted the admonitions in
The Bremen and Sherck to abandon parochial attitudes. They both defended United
States antitrust laws from accusations of parochialism, when the criticism of these
cases was leveled at overly protective judicial attitudes and not any particular body
of law. "The utility of the Convention in promoting the process of international
commercial arbitration depends upon the willingness of national courts to let go of
matters they normally would think of as their own." Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3361
n.21 (emphasis added).
1 Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3356.
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antitrust law could lead to further statutory retaliation by those
countries.7
2
IV. CONCLUSION
Mitsubishi represents the latest development of a trend in the federal
courts favoring arbitration. It is difficult to imagine a decision which
could be more unqualified in its support of the enforcement of
international arbitration agreements. Parties to an international con-
tract which have decided that, for whatever reason,"7 they want to
keep the resolution of disputes arising from the contract out of the
courts can now expect the courts to abide by such a decision. Mit-
subishi is also significant as being the Court's first attack on the
American Safety doctrine. Whether this attack will affect domestic
cases remains to be seen, but the present federal policy toward
enforcement of antitrust laws indicates that it could.
William L. Blagg
72 For example, these countries might implement discovery-blocking legislation or
refuse to enforce court awards where choice of forum clauses entered into by its
nationals are consistently invalidated by United States courts seeking to retain ju-
risdiction over antitrust matters. See generally Pettit & Styles, The International
Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37
Bus. LAW. 697 (1982); Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application
of United States Antitrust Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 585 (1981); Comment, Shortening
the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and the Foreign
Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REV. 213 (1982).
" For a general discussion of why parties tend to choose arbitration over litigation
see Yates, supra note 43, at 225-32 (citing facts such as costs, speed, and confi-
dentiality).

